

\auto\campaign.s
July 11, 1994

--early 1978: N-bomb. AMsterdam rally; UK, Denmark, Sweden, Norway.

--april 78--april 79: Rocky Flats

Actions

Interviews in fall: Horowitz, Ballad (NBC)

Trial

Jonestown (Mark Lane); Moscone/Milk

Last action, trial

--Feb 78: UCWeapons Labs Conversion Project

--Feb 78: read Haldeman, Ends of Power

--early 77: founding of MfS (Norma Becker; Phil Berrigan in jail; Sid Lens, The Day Before Doomsday)

--Spring 1977; reading and writing notes on Marx, Anderson, Wallerstein (and Buddhism)

--editorial board of Socialist Revolution: quitting in July 1977 (they schedule meeting for August 6, 1977: Hiroshima Day, start of MfS: MGE's first rally)

--Thus: MGE born on May 12, 1977!

--(? Paul Jacobs' cancer must have appeared about same time; he died in early 1978)

--concern about neutron bomb

--August 6 and 7, rallies at GG Park and Diablo

--October: first (?) teach-ins on nuclear war. "Start of movement to abolish nuclear weapons: as, to end VN War. Can we succeed? We did last time."

--October 31: Hersh confirms my delegation stories.
DELEGATION ISSUE.

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Chronology

- 1931 Daniel Ellsberg was born in Chicago, Ill. His father, Harry Ellsberg, was a structural engineer, and the son of a Russian immigrant who came to this country to escape the Russian draft. His mother, the former Adele Charsky, was employed as a private secretary, and was originally from Denver, Colo. Daniel was the second of three children. (8) (5)
- 1935-45 Daniel spent his childhood in a middle class suburb of Detroit, Mich. He studied piano as a child, although he abruptly abandoned this pursuit at age 15. His ethnic background, and the ethnic background of his community, was Jewish, although he was not raised a practicing Jew. He was raised a Christian Scientist. Years later Daniel Ellsberg claims that this childhood religious background instilled in him a "sense of responsibility." (8) (NYT)
- 1945 Daniel received a scholarship to Cranbrook, an exclusive prep school in Bloomfield Hills, Mich. He received this scholarship as a bright minority (Jewish) student. His peer relationships at Cranbrook were not good. His heroes were people like Walter Reuther. His peers' families represented upper level management and anti-union groups. A teacher at Cranbrook remembers Daniel as a loner, however his athletic ability, scholastic achievement, and musical prowess were outstanding. (8) (9)
- 1946 At age 15 Daniel was in an auto accident in which his mother and younger sister died. This and other automobile accident experiences caused him considerable duress, and a series of nightmares.
- 1948 Ellsberg, in his senior year at Cranbrook, had a cumulative average of 95.5. He scored a perfect 800 on his verbal aptitude college board. His classmates voted him most likely to make a contribution to human progress. He was recommended to Harvard. (9)
- September 1948 Harvard accepted Ellsberg. He arrived at Harvard on a Pepsi-Cola scholarship. His ambition was to become a writer. There were strong possibilities of such a career. Daniel's Cranbrook English teacher considered his thesis worthy of publication. (9)
- 1948-49 Freshman Year Ellsberg's career interests changed. After serious consideration of the field of psychiatry he settled on economics as a major field of concentration. (9)
- Summers 1949-50 Summer employment for Daniel Ellsberg showed his continued interest in the working classes. He worked both at farm labor on a ranch in Wyoming, and at punch press operation in a Detroit factory. (9)

1950-51 Ellsberg edited the Harvard Advocate, the undergraduate literary magazine, in which two of his own stories were published. (9)

January 1951 Daniel married a Radcliffe Junior, Carol Cummings. This marriage long before graduation was considered somewhat unusual. (9)

1951-52 Ellsberg worked on the editorial staff of the Crimson, one of two rival campus newspapers. His contributions, usually anonymous, were always excellent. (5)

November 1951 Ellsberg was one of a group of Crimson editors who removed the treasures metal bird, the Ibis, from the roof of the rival publication, the Lampoon. (7)

June 1952 Daniel Ellsberg graduated from Harvard summa cum laude in economics. (5)

September 1952 Following graduation he earned a Woodrow Wilson fellowship to further study economics at King's College, Cambridge. While in England he sought employment in a steel mill. This is indicative of his continued interest in the working classes. (10)

1953 Ellsberg returned to Harvard to begin work on a Master's Degree. At his oral examinations he received a grade of excellent plus. (10)

1953 Ellsberg enlists in the peacetime military establishment, Marine Corps. He eventually became a platoon leader. After two years as a marine, as he was preparing to return to Harvard, Ellsberg extended his military contract as a result of the Suez Crisis. (10) (PD)

1958 Summer While still a Junior Fellow at Harvard, and while working toward his PhD. in economics, Ellsberg began consulting for the Rand Corp. (PD) (10)

1959 First Quarter Ellsberg contributed policy statements to the presidential campaign of J. F. Kennedy. Kennedy wanted a unique weapon to place confidence in. Ellsberg developed the concept of "the infantryman." (11)

March 1959 Ellsberg delivers a series of lectures at the Boston Public Library. The theme of these lectures was "the art of coercion: a study of threats in economic conflict and war." (10)

June 1959 Ellsberg received his Master's Degree from Harvard. (PD)

1959 Last Quarter Daniel Ellsberg, his wife, and two small children, moved to Los Angeles, where he was to become a Rand Corp. economist. (11)

February 1960 Ellsberg first visited Vietnam. He wrote a report stating that the situation there was unpromising. (11)

1961 Immediately following President Kennedy's speech announcing the Cuban Missile Crisis, Ellsberg was called to Washington to work with Defense and State Department work groups. This activity validated his anti-Communist feelings. (11)

1962 Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, Ellsberg's PhD. thesis was submitted to Harvard. This work made him a proven authority in the field of systems analysis, and much in demand at Rand. He began to work closely with Henry Rowen who is now the president of Rand Corp. (5)

1964-65 Ellsberg worked as a researcher on the Vietnam war. He entered the Defense Department as Special Assistant to John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs. Daniel was now on the inside of U. S. strategic studies. (PD) (Time) (11) (25)

1964 At the Pentagon Ellsberg considered himself a cold war Democrat dedicated to improving our position against the Communists. He was known as one of "McNamara's Whiz Kids." In a speech he wrote for McNamara he inserted the line, "The only way to think of the Viet Cong is to think of the Mafia." (1) (5)

1964 Last Quarter Carol Ellsberg filed divorce proceedings. The amount of time spent in his vocation as researcher brought about the disintegration of his marriage. Daniel is reported to have been "oblivious" and "surprised" when Carol began legal proceedings. Daniel volunteered to become an in-country observer in Vietnam. (Time) (11)

May 1965 Daniel toured college campuses as a Defense Department spokesman speaking in favor of the war at a variety of teach-ins. (11) (12) (PD)

1965 Summer Ellsberg became a civilian pacification adviser in Vietnam. In this role he found the action which he had missed as a Marine. He became a member of Major General Edward Lansdale's senior liaison office of elite intelligence agents. (1) (PD) (Time)

1966 Ellsberg changed jobs. He began evaluating the new pacification program for the U. S. embassy. He was critical of the program, and wrote several reports stating that the pacification exists on paper only. (13) (Time)

1967 Daniel is removed from Vietnam and hospitalized for hepatitis. At this time he felt that we were sending people to die in hopeless effort. He felt that we were destroying the society in Vietnam, and that the war must be stopped.

1966
Summer
to the fifteenth reunion of his Harvard class. Among his remarks were the following. "I'm proud to have served in Vietnam with Lansdale, and I've learned fully as much as I hoped; and learned to care deeply for this tortured country.... But much of this knowledge is painful: I don't seem to have the temperament of a pathologist.... It has been, most of it, an intensely frustrating and sad year and a half, though with a good deal of excitement and moments of hope.... I have virtually decided to go home, and make my contribution to the Vietnam problem we all share from there." (PD) (14)

1967
Third Quarter
Ellsberg returned to the Rand Corp. working out of the Santa Monica, Calif. office. (6)

1967
Late
Daniel told McNamara and Katzenback in private that we should get a civilian government in Vietnam that would negotiate with the N.L.F. and get us out of there. (14)

1967
Late
At Rand, Ellsberg actively participated in writing the study that would eventually be called the Pentagon Papers, (Time)

1967
November
During the massive march on the Pentagon, Ellsberg stood at the window with Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, watching the demonstrators. He was conscious of the fact that most of his friends were on the other side of the window. Among the demonstrators were the future Mrs. Ellsberg, Patricia Marx, and Mrs. McNamara. (PD)

1968
March
Ellsberg consulted in the meetings which reversed Johnson's Vietnam policy, deepening U.S. involvement. (14)

1968
June
Ellsberg participated in a conference sponsored by the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs. He told the conference that the bombing of Vietnam had turned Vietnam into a vast zoo and refugee camp. The lesson learned from our action in Vietnam, according to Ellsberg, is clear to the world. Bombing is as American as apple pie. Ellsberg also spoke of a very low likelihood of real success in the future. (14)

1968
Fall
Henry Kissinger included Ellsberg in an informal task force to set up options for the Nixon administration's foreign policy. (14)

1968
October
Ellsberg and five of his Rand Corp. colleagues wrote a letter critical of the Vietnam war effort to the New York Times. This letter called for unilateral withdrawal by the U.S. within one year. This was the first statement critical of the war which was addressed to the public that Ellsberg had ever signed. (POW 39) (6)

1968
Late
Ellsberg began to read and digest the forty-seven volumes of the Pentagon study. This task would take him until August, 1969. (14)

Christmas Day 1968	Ellsberg and two other Rand Corp. colleagues met with Henry Kissinger in New York to discuss the policy options open on Vietnam. Ellsberg had been in charge of this project. (POW 23)
1969 Early	Ellsberg attempted to prove the value of the papers, and to encourage government officials to study them. He contacted Henry Kissinger, John D. Holum (legislative assistant to Sen George McGovern), and Rep. Paul McCloskey. All but McCloskey refuse. He accepted a number of Xerox sheets which bore no classification markings for storage in his congressional office safe. (25) (PD)
September 30, 1969	Using a friend's Xerox machine, Ellsberg copied several thousand pages of the Pentagon study which he would eventually distribute to the press. (NYT)
November 1969	Ellsberg began to put his feelings regarding Vietnam more and more on the record. He spoke to many student groups stating facts taken from the Pentagon study, but not indicating the source. (25)
1969 Late	Ellsberg continued his efforts to relay information from the papers to government officials. He maintained a belief that the system would respond if informed. His conversation shifted to a style dividing the war into specific crimes and criminals. (14)
1969 Fall	Daniel began his campaign to reveal to the American people the contents of the Pentagon study. (POW 12)
January 1970	At a conference in Cambridge, Ellsberg rose from the floor to ask Henry Kissinger for an estimate of Vietnamese casualties under Nixon's Vietnamization program. Kissinger evaded the question by calling it "racist." (Time)
1970 Early	At a war crimes conference chaired by Telford Taylor Ellsberg indicated that papers existed corresponding to the Nuremberg documents. His tact at this point was to get the documents into the courts.
May 1970	Ellsberg testified before the Fulbright committee. He expressed a desire that President Nixon might have access to the studies prepared for McNamara. (15)
1970 Spring	With the feeling that his services were no longer desired by the Rand Corp., Ellsberg resigned and accepted a position as Senior Researcher at MIT's Center for International Studies. He began work on a book about Vietnam. (1) (6) (8) (Time) (25)
1970 Summer	Daniel married Patricia Marx, a Radcliffe graduate and daughter of Louis Marx (toy manufacturer and loyal Nixon supporter). (6) (25)

12, 1970

a Quagmire" to the American Political Science Association in Los Angeles. He summed up the thesis of this paper as follows. "What we have done in Indochina has been in response to choices, deliberate responsible choices by a succession of Presidents - reflecting their personal values, personal views and political stakes, as well as their views of strategic interests." Ellsberg maintained that the American people had been led to believe the myth of the misled President. (PD)

March
1971

New York Times reporter Neil Sheehan visited Cambridge. Possibly the initial documents were released on this visit. The Times began work on the series of articles based on the Pentagon Papers shortly after this date. (Time)

April
1971

In answer to the segments of the public who could condemn a massacre in California and yet condone one in Asia, Ellsberg purchased a box of red, white and blue buttons which he had inscribed "Free Manson and Calley." (8)

May 6,
1971

In Government Center, Boston, Ellsberg and several thousand others tried to prevent federal employees from going to work as a protest of U.S. War policy. The police made several charges into the crowds. Daniel was in the way of one of these charges. He was clubbed in the head. He drew a parallel, his position and the people of Indochina. Violence being wrought upon them, and completely incapable of warding that violence off. (PD)

June 13,
1971

First story based on classified Pentagon study was published in the Sunday New York Times.

September
1971

Daniel Ellsberg receives an award as "Federal Employee of the Year" from the Federal Employees for Peace. (NYT)

Potpourri

A majority of the information, in fact all that I am able to place in a rough chronology, is contained in the preceding section of this report. There is, however, a certain amount of information regarding the life of Daniel Ellsberg prior to June 13, 1971 which does not conform to this framework, but which is of considerable importance if we are to attempt an understanding of the man. In this section I will attempt to relate these bits and pieces which I have taken as fact or honest impression. They are arranged in what I hope is a logical, if not a time oriented, manner.

Ellsberg's decision to leave Harvard and become a marine lieutenant was a unique one. He can remember only one other person of his Crimson crowd who gave up his deferment and followed a similar course. It was not unexpected. His family tradition, at least in this country, was one of military service. (1)

Harry Ellsberg, Daniel's father, shared his position in opposition to the war. Following Daniel's public stance against the war effort Harry wrote his son saying how right he thought Daniel was. Following the Time cover story Harry wrote Daniel and said, "Dan, there are boys dying over there every day. What do I care what they write about you? You've got to go on doing what you have to do." These statements may indicate something of the father/son relationship during the formative years. (18)

An old friend reports that ever since he has known Ellsberg, he has had this almost evangelistic need to communicate to those around him the truth that he had just discovered. (NYT)

Ellsberg distrusts other people's nerve and ability. As a Harvard undergraduate he felt that as long as he did not have to depend on anybody else, he could get through anything that happened. (9)

Ellsberg does not see any contradiction in his own life. In a recent interview he said, "My whole life is one big thing, it's coming to appear very coherent." (18)

Ellsberg's doctoral thesis is stored in a safe in the Widener Library at Harvard. Also stored in the safe are the theses of John F. Kennedy and Henry Kissinger. (17)

Shortly after his return from England, Daniel described himself as a Truman Democrat. "I was a liberal on domestic matters and, on foreign policy, a tough guy." (10)

When working for the Rand Corp. Daniel became a protégé of Henry Rowen who is now the president of Rand. One of the difficult decisions Ellsberg made when making the Pentagon study public was one regarding potential personal damage to Rowen. Shortly after the release of the film Dr. Strangelove Rowen and Ellsberg viewed it. They were able to recognize every character in the picture. (5) (8)

During his days at Rand and in Washington Ellsberg worked with the premise that one could not go wrong improving the knowledge of the President. The idea of serving the President seemed a high calling to him. (PD)

During his first visit to Vietnam, in the early Kennedy years, Ellsberg wrote a report stating that the situation was unpromising. (11)

Arriving in Vietnam in 1965 he was optimistic, if open-minded, about the possibilities of American success. He was convinced that communism was not the best course for Vietnam to follow. (12)

The Vietnamese people, Ellsberg observed, expected death, and the killing of women and children from a distance as part of the American war of war. (3)

Dan saw his own contribution to the war effort as that of a participant in a conspiracy to commit a number of war crimes, including aggressive war. (6) (13)

Ellsberg went to Vietnam because of bitter frustration over not being able to understand events at a distance through cables and reports. While there he began to understand the frustration of planners and soldiers when fighting a war where nothing seems to work, where rules do not apply, and where, day after day, they are confronted by impotence and failure. (3) (17)

General Lansdale, Ellsberg's Vietnam boss, described him as independent and brilliant but lacking in security discipline. (27)

A former Pentagon colleague thought that Daniel would have been an excellent Jesuit in another time. He described him as having a perfect logical mind and an unbending sense of morality. (5)

A friend said that Ellsberg's reversal from a pro-war to an unequivocal antiwar position was completely in character. He described Daniel as sensitive, passionate, and immensely intelligent. "When he was a hawk, he wanted to be up along the DMZ fighting. When he became a dove, he became an active dove." (5)

A commentator, following the release of the papers called the event a case of primeval inevitable humanity manifesting itself in a new way - handing secret documents over to the public. (19)

Jerry Rubin described Ellsberg as open, eager to learn. He also commented on Daniel's fondness for associating with the big names in radicalism. (NYT)

Again, following the release of the Papers, another commentator claimed that Daniel Ellsberg was the man that Lt. Calley was punished for not being: an employee who, in the name of human rights, disobeys the orders of his superiors. (21)

Following the disclosure of the Papers Ellsberg expected to be sentenced to prison for a few years. (2)

Ellsberg's own statement regarding his personal future was, " " Ten years in prison is very cheap if that would contribute to ending this war." (23)

Among books which Ellsberg picks as having influenced his recent development are the following.

Conquest of Violence: the Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict,
Joan V. Bondurant

We Have Been Invaded by the 21st Century, Dave McReynolds
The Politics of History, Howard Zinn

Revolution and Equilibrium, Barbara Deming (29)

Ellsberg regularly receives a large quantity of mail. Among this is usually a quantity of hate mail. Daniel remembers only one piece of this hate mail which has not also been anti-Semitic. The one exception, written by a Jew, compares him with Benedict Arnold. (NYT) (17)

Ellsberg was very selective regarding the documents released. Those involving negotiations he did not publish. He believed that none of the information released could do damage to our national interest. (23)

He has become increasingly outspoken regarding the war. Recently he spoke of former President Johnson's account of the war as a "set of lies." (24)

A friend speculated that Ellsberg on trial would be interesting because, "he'd like a platform like that."

When his name became associated with the release of the Pentagon Papers, he immediately became one of the peace elite. Now his peers are Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, Philip Berrigan, etc., and his medium is the television talk show.

Turning Points

When dealing with a person whose values or standards seem to have reversed it is interesting to attempt to locate one focal point around which the change takes place. This is not to say that we are looking for one particular experience which caused Ellsberg to change from hawk into dove. Such an experience is a very remote possibility. Rather, we are looking for a pivot point, a precipitating incident, which draws new knowledge together, confirms existing motivation for change, and from which a new motivation seems to proceed.

One of the interesting things about Ellsberg is that there does not seem to be a single such incident. There are many. Although Ellsberg does not see any contradiction in his own life, as reported in the previous section, he speaks of at least two such summits. Patricia Ellsberg, who is frequently accused as being "the one who changed Dan," offers a third. Daniel's friends and professional associates point to several more.

What follows here is a summary of several incidents thought to have been turning points for Daniel Ellsberg.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. influenced Ellsberg a great deal. At one point he looked to King as the potential savior of this country. After meeting Mrs. King and Jesse Jackson one evening Jackson commented that the voice of Dr. King had had a great influence on Ellsberg. (17)

Before leaving for Vietnam, Ellsberg made the college rounds speaking in support of U.S. Vietnam policy. At Harvard he debated Prof. Stanley Hoffman. Hoffman requested evidence that present policy offered a chance of preventing a Vietcong victory. Ellsberg could not supply such evidence, and finally said, "There might be a time when we have to ask how we can fail best." This statement was not at all in line with any official Vietnam Statements. When Ellsberg returned from Vietnam, he called Hoffman to tell him that he had been completely right. (12)

while flying across the Plain of Reeds Ellsberg and the aircraft pilot dived and shot several times at two men who looked like fishermen. The men did not return fire. The Plain of Reeds was a free fire zone. Daniel reports coming away from that plane ride with a strong sense of unease. (4) (Time)

One of Ellsberg's Vietnamese friends, Tran Ngoc Chan, was jailed for maintaining contact with his brother who was V.C. even though he had informed the South Vietnamese government of his intentions. The Vietnamese high court annuled his conviction of any crime, yet President Thieu refused to release him. Daniel was appalled by this action. (NYT)

In the introduction to his book of papers on the war Ellsberg simply states that once he had concluded that we would fail in Vietnam he began actively working toward ending our involvement. (POW)

A journalist who knew Daniel in Vietnam caaims that it was the violence, the constant excessive violence that first changed Ellsberg's mind about the war even before his moral stand against communism changed. (14)

In a conference at Princeton in April, 1968 Daniel met an Indian Girl who gave him a Gandhian vision, a different way of living and resistance. Nonviolent power and a world without enemies became his ideals. It was in this light that Dr. Martin L. King, Jr. became a hero for Ellsberg. King was shot the next week. (NYT)

Beginning in Late 1968, Ellsberg read through the papers which he had hepped assemble. This he considers the final step in his turning against the war. He affirmed his belief that the war had never been legitimate. (14)

Daniel learned that the military had dropped charges against a group of Green Berets accused of murder. "I decided to stop lying that day. So it was very soon after that, very soon, that I decided to reveal this information," Ellsberg said.

Daniel underwent psychiatric analysis. Later he told friends that this had been a turning point in his life.

A Cambridge colleague sees Ellsberg as a man who attempted to talk with people without breaking the window of the policy cage. At one point, in desperation, he jumped through the glass and went screaming tothhe public. (16)

Patricia Marx visited Ellsberg in Vietnam. Many friends suggest that her influence was great in changing Daniel's mind. A number of people, including Patricia (see below) discredit this. As one journalist who knew them both said, "He went with an open mind and saw what was happening, saw that the whole thing was a mess. A lot of people did that without Patricia."

Daniel Ellsberg, however, does not discredit Patricia's influence. He maintains that she did affect his thinking. "We lose a great deal by not having women in the decision process," he said.

Patricia and Daniel Ellsberg both were asked by New York Times reporter J. Anthony Lukas for their own notion of the most important or crucial turning point. Their full responses appear below.

in his life.

Ellsberg's one great passion, his intellectual curiosity, was the decision making process. His concern was the process, not the results. This was the concern in his study of economics and the subject of his thesis. This was the nature of his work with the Rand Corp., the Department of State, and the Department of Defense. This was also his reason for visiting Vietnam.

Ellsberg read all communication from Vietnam, and could not understand how decisions were being made. He went to Vietnam. Once in Vietnam his information and reports could not change the decisions or the way in which they were being made. He was not at all comfortable with a decision such as, "In the Plain of Reeds They're all V. C."

Back at the Rand Corp. Ellsberg's study of the Papers was one of the decision process. He came to believe that decisions were frequently made contrary to the best information available, which was itself frequently wrong. Decisions were not made in a quagmire (the quagmire myth) but rather were made for reasons completely separate from the war effort.

It was this frustration with the decision making process that caused Ellsberg to take action rather than any other motivation. His concern was not with what we might traditionally call morality. Rather, it was with ^{the} responsibility of a decision maker for the various elements of information.

The pattern seems clear. The frightening part is that the same decisions may have been made for informed reasons. Ellsberg would have been satisfied, and U. S. ground troops might just possibly still be engaged in Vietnam.

\de\interests
Jan 29, 1994

--Holocaust studies; genocide(s); role of participants, bystanders (less, victims), facilitators;

--Secrecy + *Ethics*

--Lying

--Cover; covert actions; closets

--Self-deception, denial, selective perception

--Coercion

--Strategic bombing

--Nuclear weapons, planning, preparations, motives and process of nuclear arms race.

--First-use threats, role, motives, impact; past closeness to nuclear war; nuclear crises.

--Cuba II

--The construction of instability; possibilities of "inadvertent war", preemption, false alarms, unauthorized actions, "dead hand" doomsday machines.

--Terrorism, massacre motives, willingness to risk or perform, order...

--Just War

--Deterrence, and the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons

--Necessity defense (by "my side" and "by them")

--Milgram Experiments, and interpretation:
Obedience; contract; promise; conformity; authority

--Disobedience, dissent, rebellion, conscientious behavior;

--Coming out, "leaking", truth-telling

--Civil disobedience, militant non-violence, satyagraha

--Subjective probability, uncertainty, decision-making under uncertainty: Kahneman-Tversky et al, experiments.

--Ambiguity

- Reckless decision-making, gambling with catastrophe
- Possibilities and impact of Candor, openness.
- Cooperative security, non-offensive defense.
- Redirection of tax money away from military spending, conversion, changed priorities, demilitarisation of economies of world (and end of arms sales).
- Blame, blaming, avoiding blame; perceived responsibility, culpability.
- Revealed preference/efforts to conceal preference (beliefs, values, motives, aims); (see cover); effects of anticipated audience on decision-making (vs. Robinson Crusoe decision-making).
- Regret, reproach; minimizing, minimaxing, considering.
- JFK and Vietnam;
- LBJ and Vietnam: the 1964-65 conspiracy, and the escalation decision of 1965.
- RMN's aims and strategy for VN; the 1969-75 conspiracy; the role of Watergate.
- Watergate and me.
- The origins of my own preoccupations and character. The Piano and The Accident.

 Over the last two decades, I have read much, reflected, written notes; to some extent lectured on these subjects. But I have not done what I proposed to do in my MacArthur Reading and Research grant: written out notes extensively, published analyses.

(Consider the effects of Patricia's demanding--immediately after I had sent in my MacArthur proposal--that I turn to consideration of the "financial problem". This derailed my momentum for writing; it led to what she regarded (self-servingly) as my role in the "catastrophe" at the hands of her brother; and it opened up into a discussion of her attitudes over the previous 16 years toward me; which was not only preoccupying and distracting, but very depressing. Should I discuss this with Pat? Anyway, that was 7-8 years ago; not much bearing on last three years, which have been fairly well used).

Subsequently, after MBG had raised money for 2-3 years to work as freely as on MacArthur...I just didn't do it. Why? Why does the image of Ivan Karamazov's "brain fever" during his brother's

--Cuban Missile Crisis

--nuclear first-use threats.

Earlier publishing block goes back to:

--failure to shorten and publish my Ph. D. thesis, after 1962 (Tversky had some thoughts on this, which I never got. What would he say about relating my work on ambiguity to the also-unpushlished

--Art of Coercion (1959, put aside in 1961 with the excuse of the pressure of my work in Washington. Yet this could be related to later work on the Cuban Missile Crisis and to nuclear first-use threats.

--my PP volume on 1961 Vietnam decision-making. See Desperate Proposal Pattern, and my hypothesis on reckless decision-making (presented to Arrow seminar), also relating to Gulf War (and Challenger explosion, 1965 Vietnam decision).

Then there is my long-term notes on Revealed Preference, Minimizing Reproach, the issue of decision-making in view of an audience or constituency, rivals and judges, the need to avoid blame (as opposed to Robinson Crusoe decision-making, which is what most analyses implicitly assume. Perhaps my greatest intellectual break-through).

(6) Writing for publication, since 1975: I abandoned my retrospective on the war in June of 1975, when Pat put her diaphragm back in, not persuaded that I would be "present" as a partner for the baby, in view of my preoccupation with writing on Vietnam, which I considered extending through the summer. (This could be seen as the beginning of my publishing/writing block for the last twenty years: fear of losing my marriage, if I wrote in the only way I knew how, around the clock, on deadline: as in 1972.

I should conquer my fears of writing on the subjects above:

Secrecy and lies

My autobiography

The Pentagon Papers (and Watergate)

Vietnam War: Nixon's Strategy

Strategic bombing

Nuc planning

Nuc first use threats

Obed. to auth. and other motives for complicity in genocide

Ambiguity / Risk-taking

\out\story
Sept. 9, 1996

The Story

A Jewish-Christian Scientist boy is brought up to be a concert pianist, practicing six hours a day by the time he is twelve, going to grade school half days so he can practice. He doesn't attribute this to his pianist mother, despite her absorption in his piano career, he understands it to be his vocation, opportunity, his destiny.

But when he is fifteen he accepts the judgment of a new teacher that he does not have the foundation for a career as a concert pianist, and when his mother is killed in a car crash a few months later he understands himself to be free of this vocation, though he now "owes a life."

(This debt may also, or mainly, refer to the simultaneous death of his sister, eleven months younger, in the car crash, in which his knee was broken; she was sitting in the "death seat" in which it was his turn to sit at the time of the crash. The "accident" itself was prepared by a number of factors in the relations between his mother and father, which in turn may have reflected--at least, he came to suspect they did--his own passive acceptance of the end of his concert pianist prospects.

He continues his practicing for another two years in high school, but when he goes to Harvard he drops it, though he burdens his first year of college with a very demanding music theory course. Then, his musical career is over. He doesn't touch a piano for another thirty years.

He is very good at taking tests. Valedictorian of his high school class. With a perfect score twice on the language part of the SAT, he wins a full scholarship to Harvard, where he ends up third in his senior class, Phi Beta Kappa, a degree summa cum laude, and a Woodrow Wilson Fellowship to King's College, Cambridge University and an assurance that he will be nominated for a Junior Fellowship at Harvard.

Freed of the hours of practicing, at Harvard he does not only all the required reading but much of the suggested reading in his courses, gets A's in all his courses in economics, his major, in which he is soon taking graduate courses, and has time for major activities.

He gets onto the literary board of the Advocate, the nation's oldest literary magazine, at the end of his freshman year. In his second year he is the Literary Editor, and in his third the President. While Literary Editor he competes for the editorial board of the Harvard Crimson. He becomes the first person to be on

both the Advocate and the Crimson since John Reed (buried outside the Kremlin Wall). (So he is told; research might undermine this. FDR? Conant?) He is initiated into the honor society, Signet.

He meets a Radcliffe freshman, Carol Cummings, on her first day on campus (he sells her a subscription to the Advocate), dances with her and takes her back to her dorm that night at a "mixer," and begins to go steady with her within a few weeks. By the spring they are making love, daily, for hours.

The Story, approach #2

I. The Accident. Reaction to it; lack of mourning.

II. Piano, up to Kottler and the accident.

III. Childhood, up to the accident; Dad, Mother, Gloria, Harry and Margaret; grandparents; Christian Science; relation with Mother. Lou, Denver.

IV. The war. Dec. 7; Dad, Harry; newsreels, bombing, air raid precautions, movies; victory garden, scrap; H.V. Kaltenborn, Murrow; stories to Gloria of guerrilla warfare in East Europe and Russia (T.E. Lawrence, and the Seawolf); Social Science study of uranium bomb and Japanese relocation camps; Hiroshima.

V. Cranbrook. Piano, tennis, soccer. The Cranium. Third Most Humorous. Sonja Dahlgren (baseball at amusement parks; The kiss; attempted kissing; (Davidson Freeway); disk jockeys; first date (before accident). (Joan Isaacson? Refugee, E....? Harry gives me economics textbook: John Ise. I read about Memorial Day massacre, start research on labor movement; Dynamite, In Dubious Battle, Grapes of Wrath; Life, Time. Reuthers. My ten-year prediction. (Basketball "captain.") Gilbert and Sullivan, jazz. Pepsi Cola scholarship. 40 years on. British tradition; chapel, Episcopalian, empire. (earlier reading on empire). 40 years later: greatest erotic ambition, kissing while dancing (Delphoi); Saturday night movies, holding hands; dancing, Dancing in the Dark, Stardust. (First deep kiss: fireworks). Shooting of Reuther. Death of FDR.

VI. Summers

A.Lou. Apartment. Country Club. Donnie Zinn, dates, Jews. Adoption? Marijuana, Mike Duke. Cards.

B. Estes. Mountain-climbing (danger, lack of fear, after accident), streams. Long's Peak.

C. Summer between Cranbrook and Harvard: night shift at Dodge, UAW. (1943: race riot in Detroit. My story about it.)

D.

VII. Harvard.

A.The Yard. Happiness: To Have and Have Not, beer. Dates with Sargent, drama school; folk dancer, Yale Game, get drunk.

B. Advocate, Crimson, Signet economics (labor), math (Goodwin)

C. (what did I do my first summer at Harvard: Estes? Second summer: mountain-climbing, then Ranch in Wyoming? Dora Gomez; Front Street in Laramie. (Had I already started making love with Carol? I think so: check with her (!) But then, why think of Dora as my first? My first "real McCoy"? And why problem in Laramie?)

D. Summer school, economic theory; Game Theory; thesis; paper for Barrington Moore on game theory; Schelling (?) Shubik (did he urge me to go to RAND?)

VIII. King's College

IX. Graduate School

X. USMC; Suez (articles from thesis)

XI. Society of Fellows; visit to RAND (Sputnik just after: ICBMs); Mary born; depression;

XII. Summer at RAND. (Is this just after depression?) Home (after Crimson: "You're absolutely wrong"). Missile gap. Ambiguity of warning (decision theory). AJW, hsr, AE, Marshall, HK... Secrecy (and locking safes). Institute of Family Relations, marriage counselling (story of my piano); my concern about having affairs... (earlier: problem with Carol).

XIII. Society of Fellows, 1958-59; missile gap obsession; Berlin Crisis; lectures on the Art of Coercion (Princeton for drafting) (Glenn Snyder); Lowell Lectures (Gloria Steinem). Kissinger seminars. (Pallid Giant).

XIV. RAND. Command and control. PACOM Study. Authentication. (shades of my USMC potential insubordination). Delegation. Iwakuni. President's decision problem. Missile/deterrence gap (bomber gap. HK) WAR PLANS in Oahu. Contradictions in levels of plans. Eventually, JSCP in Pentagon (Air Staff, Lukeman). Visits to Tokyo, Taiwan, Hong Kong...NOBUKO. Kyoto, Gary Snyder.

A. On plans: definition of General War; (lack of plan for limited war with Soviets, lack of plan for war with Russia without China, lack of reserves: single real option; controversy on alternative undertakings; preemption; damage-limiting (Marshall reveals possibilities to me; relates to SI, U-2), "decapitation"; lack of missile gap. Advice to JFK, Rostow, Nitze. Ignored by JFK (American Legion speech).

B. Oahu, Tahiti, Marie Therese.

XV. New Frontier. Inauguration. Briefing to Nitze, later to McGeorge Bundy: JSCP, preemption, first-strike; Iwakuni;

Delegation. Study on delegation. Bay of Pigs. Drafter of BNSP (birthday). Memos. Questions for Gilpatric on JSCP (my effort to get JSCP to President--past Kaysen--or to McNamara). Shown to Komer; question on how many dead? McN cable to LeMay. Visit to SAC: Leibman, intell. (Is this after Task Force? Must be).

XVI. RDT&E Task Force (to get back to Tokyo). Caribbean, Cuba, Guantanamo, war plans. Alvarez, Shackley. Vietnam! Thailand. (Taiwan?) Hong Kong (Susan Chang); Tokyo, Nobuko, Fuji. Later start affair with Kathryn.

XVII. Berlin Crisis. Game (Chayes, Schelling, Taylor, Rostow...). SNIE: end of missile gap. Kaysen for President; speech for President; given to Gilpatric (Tim Stanley). Ends 1961 Berlin crisis; but... Briefing to RAND on SNIE: Yes Virginia. (Leak to me of T and K data). But not believed; and neither I nor anyone else draw appropriate conclusions, respond (see Garthoff) (Compare to 1991, end of Cold War).

XVIII. 1962. Thesis on Ambiguity (from article in 1961?). Then week in Washington: BNSP (Rostow), JSCP review for Gilpatric, Ann Arbor speech for McNamara. Yale commencement with Kathryn. Harvard 10th Reunion: Ph. D. (orals) (earlier, I commit myself with my reunion biography). (I could do that again! What is to be done, by June 1997: a draft?) Plan: work fall for RAND, then to Washington; but Carol won't go. [When was acid, with Carol and me? 1960? again 1962?]

XIX. Cuban Missile Crisis. questions raised; lessons.

XX. 1963. Nuclear Crises interest. Role of President; secrets. Work in Pentagon on NATO strategy (Carol: spend as much time as you want in Washington). Meet Yvonne. Economic Club speech, NATO speech Paris (which first?). (Robert sick?) Neustadt Study (Fait Malaccompli: analogy of Skybolt with Cuba II; later, with Suez, U-2). (Earlier, Neustadt book as Bible). Yarmolinsky offer (to be his assistant, prospect of replacing him eventually). But Carol won't go. JFK Assassination. Just before it, talk with Burt Klein on leaving Carol for Washington, "I'll never forgive you," I crying. Drafting speech for LBJ, quote from Jefferson Memorial. (With Yvonne in motel during JFK funeral). Turn down Yarmolinsky. Christmas with Carol (make love for first time in a year). My/her? parents there.

XXI. 1964. New Year's Day (night before?): Carol says she wants a divorce. Party with Goodmans, Betsy Drake Grant. Breakfast with John Wilkes. (alive still? Ruth ---, JSCP? Others from study?) (Recall WSEG studies: Ponturo, Paul Johnstone). Motel. Joan Roberts; Bora Bora (Donald Nixon); other from RAND. Robert's Cub Scout initiation. TCS organizes Nuclear Crisis Study. (I get SI clearance: for first time? Also Alfa (?) for Talent). To Washington. Hopes for WSEG studies, but problems; Rostow group;

Cuba II; PFIAB studies, Southard, ---; U-2; Suez. (Compare to published). State Eyes Only File. Telcons. SU-President letters. Post Mortems at CIA.

XXII. mid-1964. Pentagon. JTM offers me Special Assistant, GS-18. Tonkin Gulf, as my start. Clearances (12). NoDis, Eyes Only; secrecy; Mike Forrestal gaffe. "Truth Squad" for Yarmolinsky, LBJ, vs. Goldwater (who is getting TS from LeMay: his speechwriter later tells me, Karl Hess). Campaign Lies. Chaos in Vietnam. How to Lose in Vietnam. Provocation plans.

XXIII. Chinese bomb, Indian request episode; Gilpatric Committee (revelation of ambivalence on proliferation); rejected by President during Rolling Thunder arguments. I draft papers on Faits Malaccomplis; deliver report to Rostow Committee. (A later committee meeting, with Helms, Des Fitzgerald, Helms mentions to me there is no OSA, re Hilsman's article in Look about the Cuban Missile Crisis).

XXIV. Election Day: meeting on (bombing) options. WPB: backing out of the saloon. (Did Reston later use this image to explain 1969 strategy, or later, i.e. under N/HAK?) JCS reaction; Jonathan Moore retrieves memo. McG/McN memo (I don't see this then?) Pleiku. Qui Nhon (can't remember Pleiku). Up all night gathering atrocities, to help McN persuade LBJ to start RT. McN thanks me, through JTM, after WH meeting. Why didn't I resign? (Too tired?) Consequences... White Paper on Vietnam; NVN boat "discovered" with arms (Ralph McGeehee exposes later); appendix on weapons captured, defectors; IF Stone critiques ("unfairly").

XXV. Rolling Thunder starts. Troops to Vietnam. USMC: JTM tries to replace them. Use of B-52s. Chemical weapons. On B-52 proposal, I consider resigning; Col. Rogers says no, it will be turned down; Taylor is simply passing the buck to Washington. Assurance that nothing can go wrong; 3 B-52s go down. (Search and Rescue pattern, my diagram; my memory of this when Vance resigns over Iran hostage raid in 1980). Symposium; I meet EGL; fear of "VN being cut in two."

XXVI. April 16-17: SDS Demonstration against the war; my first date with Patricia. Next day, cherry blossoms, picnic, we make love.

XXVII. First bombing pause. My "IF Stone critique". My study of NVA infiltration, possible Alsop reaction. My study of mining Haiphong; McNamara thanks me. Teach-ins: me at Ohio, Harvard (Stanley Hoffman). My pitch. My speech for JTM ("VC as Mafia. Need to learn how to defeat insurgency." (Earlier: I fail to complete a speech for JTM on time; no prospect of becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary; compares to hsr).

XXVIII. Rogers fired (why? Ask Harry Harris?) I read Ball memos, others; then lock is changed on me too. I move to office on inside

ring; do interviews on "long range planning" (JTM, on establishing an office to look ahead, by months: "You don't understand! I want to be Out, Out, Out...by the end of the year." (Has LBJ made a deal with Congress heads, to be out...or negotiating...by end of year?

XXIX. I look into reentering active duty in USMC: Robertson says I would go in as major, I prefer captain. Patricia meets Mang at Princeton; I predict she will make love with him. (I expect to see Joan in LA on visit to kids). Next week I guess, "You're in love with someone...Mang?" "I didn't think it showed. I wasn't going to say anything." The next week I volunteer to go to VN with EGL, in meeting of the Bundy Committee (Unger Committee?) Tell him of my "craziness," in volunteering to go to VN as captain; Conein checks this out. Pat arrives, to tell me she can spend fall in Washington; I tell her I'm going to VN. She's pissed.

XXX. Vance Committee on decisions on escalation; mobilization plans. I'm to draft speech for McNamara. "We're containing China" (to Al Friedman. Earlier, no mention of China). LBJ press conference: Crucial lie. (No mobilization; no mention of changed mission...or was that about same time? Mission changed on April 1/6. 50,000 to be sent, not 100,000. (New book on McNamara gets it wrong: see Halberstam review).

XXXI. Kids come to Washington: Lincoln Memorial, second Inaugural citation. Yvonne drives me to airport, to meet team. Pat meets me in Hawaii. I feel I am her lover, John Simon is her intellectual (I can't criticise movies or literature...); misreading. To Vietnam.

XXXII. Vietnam, mid-1965. Team. Ky. Jerry Rose. Khang. Power shortage: letter home, which becomes Reporter piece. Meet Good Guys: Bumgardner, Scotton, Werbiski, ...meet Vann: whores. Trip to Hau Nghia (trip report). (Put these parts--or whole Papers? --on Web? Or bring Papers up to date, with retrospective on Quagmire Myth? VN papers on Web: e.g., RAMJET, memos...) Speech for Ky. (Habib kills further help). Letters to Pat: quote. Meet Chau in Kien Hoa. "Contesting the Revolution." Lansdale boxed in. I write pacification guidance for Mission.

XXXIII. Germaine.

XXXIV. Pat comes out. Thailand; India; Konarak; Benares; I propose in Ganges;

XXXV. Humphrey Honolulu trip: section 8. Gets Ky over-excited. I brief Herald Tribune reporter Doug Kiker on LBJ's underreporting on Westy troop requests. (First time I "educate" a reporter). Buddhist crisis. Chau despondent. (Back in Washington, JTM and McNamara consider leaving). Ky wins. April 7, my "35 party": cancelled for

curfew; Frankie (when had I met her, in IV Corps?) and I go out, get nearly stuck. John and I drive to all the III Corps province towns: Hop Tac area (the Big Store); finally, Khanh Hoa (?) and Xuan Loc (Vlad Lehovich); finally, Vung Tau ("500 VC crossing road").

XXXVI. Pat comes out to go to Japan, but I'm tied into RAMJET: recommendations on disbanding Rangers, abandoning all bombing in South Vietnam except close air support (dismissed by Westmoreland). She investigates refugees with Frankie (fields of shit). Party for Sheehans leaving; diplomat with ICC, just back from Hanoi, bombing; Pat says, "How can you be part of this?" I get discouraged (I'm one of the Good Guys, just recommended on stopping bombing, etc. Don't I get any credit or benefit of the doubt? Also, she's come back reindoctrinated; the doubts I had instilled in January, Hoang Van Chi, are dissipated (she's seen Mang again, not just Simon and Aaron Asher). We go to Hong Kong, but in my mind we're no longer engaged (this was not clear to her).

XXXVII. Leave to US; called to Washington to accompany Katzenbach (and McNamara, JTM, Wheeler, HAK) to Vietnam. Show them all my memos on the plane. Show Katzenbach around VN (and his assistant, later head of NYT Magazine: see him? Rosenthal). Back on plane, McNamara asks me to settle dispute with Komer: Things are the same "which means they're worse." Then McNamara tells press, "everything is better." (I describe this to Pat in letter--quote--which means I am still writing her?)

On with home leave, "to say goodbye" (I expect to die; in retrospect, I'm depressed; breakup with Patricia). To Acapulco with Yvonne (children come?) (don't see Patricia: where is she? what is our relation?) See AJW and Roberta...

XXXVIII. The Day Loc Tien Was Pacified. (Papers: include? Web?) sent back to Washington. Begin to pick up equipment: Swedish K; boots; When was Ben Suc? (see Jonathan Schell account).

XXXIX. Rach Kien

XL. Germaine and Michel

XLI. Patrols: Combined Action Patrol, Danang (Corson). Bill Bundy. DMZ? Hue? Visit to Hau Nghia with Pamela. Flight to Bangkok, Vung Tau. Pamela. Girls. Taxi to Bangkok: hepatitis. AJW./ Tell Pamela and girls. Rest home.

XLII. Back to Vietnam, bed. Long memos on pacification, election, Ky and Thieu. Chau helps, reads (and Ton That Thien; Dr. Dan earlier?) shows to Thieu. Germaine. Say goodbye to Gen. W; airport with Chau and Vann. Flight to Cairo (lit up); to Paris (Cairo bombed)...etc. Swedish Embassy briefing.

XLIII.

\jour\Oct17.95
Tuesday, day after return from Wellfleet

Morning thoughts, 7AM:

I could dialog, not with McN but with McGeorge Bundy, who will see me. Or Bill Bundy. Or conceivably get both together; and/or with their children, on the subject of secrecy. When should you talk, when not?

Bill Bundy was presumably also in Skull and Bones. Kai should talk to others in Skull and Bones, preferably with one or the other Bundy. Study the ideology, rituals of Skull and Bones. The culture of secrecy and loyalty.

{Get Aftergood in on this, too.}

Have Kai see McNamara. Have him investigate whether McN would see me on these issues. Maybe Kai could meet Bundys with me. In any case, I could give him questions to ask (before he raises question with them of meeting me).

Issues of loyalty. Should I have done anything different? (What do they think I should have done?) My answer: yes. I should unquestionably have put out the war plans in 1961 or later. That would have been difficult (as well as dangerous: virtually sure prison), but there must have been some way to do it. Oct 95

Second, I unquestionably should have put out the current Pentagon Papers in 1964: in August-September-October, before the election and during hearings on Tonkin Gulf, or later. Before Rolling Thunder. on my speech draft, c'65!

So should they, of course. Talk about, putting out information "when it could still do some good", as people taxed McN with not doing! That means, before November 1964; or before February, 1965; or, "finally," before April (Marine mission changed) or July (open-ended escalation). That means a full year period, from Tonkin Gulf to July 28 (one week short of a year).

I'm still not able to answer why I didn't do something--at least to get out, distance myself, but preferably to expose and block it--at the time of Rolling Thunder, which I didn't believe in at all. Instead, perhaps in fatigue, I actually aided the process; and then, encouraged the sending of troops!

[A necessity defense doesn't work, legally, if you have caused or contributed to the developments that make the "lesser evil" action "necessary." It may still be right to take the action, but you don't have a legal defense; you must be accountable, pay the legal price. This is the point of the Inspector General story by Hugo; and it does apply to me!

Thus, since the US strongly provoked and contributed to the Soviet buildup of nuclear weapons that made our continued buildup allegedly "necessary," we did not have a legal defense. Nor was our "response" appropriate. At the same time, the Soviets, by threatening Europe, could be said to have encouraged our own nuclear threats; so their "deterrent" acquisition of nuclear weapons was not legally/morally "justified."

[In either case, one could argue--or at least explore whether or not it was the case--that a more appropriate "response" would be to remove or reverse the "provocation" and to reassure the adversary, ending the crisis.]

When should McN have talked? What should Speer have done? (Does Sereny answer this?)

How idiosyncratic was it "not to think of exposing the guilty secrets? Did anyone else think of doing it? Did anyone else do it? If no one, so far as can be told, thought of doing such a thing: is there culpability? "Should" they have thought of it? (Speer says yes, and that therefore he is as guilty as if he had "known" and thought of doing something).

It is this sort of test and challenge that officials try to avert by keeping secret what they have "considered," what the "options" were, what was analyzed or actually recommended and rejected. (Avoiding Reproach, avoiding Revealing Preference, Revealing Rejection).

At what point do you begin to bear moral responsibility for not perceiving something, not thinking of something, not considering doing something?

What if someone does put it to you very strongly, it does reach your attention temporarily, but you manage to repress this memory within hours or days, and to forget that you ever heard it?

(A common bureaucratic phenomenon, which may be misleading when it turns up in the records: A proposal is made at one point,

within or by one agency, to some official; it is rejected under the circumstances of that moment, and given the bureaucratic and political power lineup at that time. Later, when circumstances have changed to make it both more appropriate, optimal, and more feasibly bureaucratically or politically, it may not be remembered by any of the "players" at that time, and may not again be considered at all. Or it may be recalled only as an option that was rejected for good reason (with the reasons, and the circumstances at that time, not being recalled) and thus not considered seriously again. Is this failure culpable?)

Or what if a paper comes across your desk and you did sign it. Or you didn't, because your special assistant didn't show it to you. But was he following your directives, explicit or tacit, as to what you wanted brought to your attention? How did you respond when he showed you similar information in the past, or failed to?

The role of a special assistant--in managing your attention and information and "options"--and the training of a special assistant to meet your needs and priorities, is analogous to the processes of denial, repression, and selective attention in an individual. Only they are relatively visible, evidence of an intention to achieve "plausible denial" or to focus one's attention, in part to avoid reproach or prosecution.

What is the difference in moral responsibility, in this context, relating to whether you did or did not see this information? And whether or one or another sense, you might or should have seen it, especially "if you wanted"? (See Speer's claimed sense of guilt).

Note that this was the function I learned and performed for McNaughton. Recall my instructions--for my own benefit!--not to let even a secretary see my drafting on "different ways of losing in Vietnam, and which ones are preferable." And the training I got in who not to tell about restricted access lists for cables. (Forrestal!) The Ball memos... (and my final transgression!) (And how delicately, and tacitly, it was dealt with).

It's also a choice, a decision, as to whether you do or do not have time: to postpone, to search, to analyze further, to explore, to generate hypotheses and alternatives, to reconsider the whole paradigm...

What defines a "crisis" is that little time is available. But what determines that? What are the marks of that? What rules do you have for shifting that? E.g., "the decision must be made by the time of this speech...a response to this cable...this hearing..." But notice that these are all changeable, to some extent. They are not of the character, "The missiles are on the way."

Do you have a decision in the latter case, or not (if they really are coming?) Actually, yes: though this is rarely realized in advance. After all, in *The Crimson Tide* (which Cathy saw on Monday on the way home), it is probably absurd to think that it is appropriate to fire those missiles in any circumstances: it can only make matter worse.

Were the submarine missiles aimed at bases that would otherwise be launching missiles? Would the submarine crew even know where the missiles were aimed? Or were they aimed at cities? What would be the rush or necessity of hitting those cities?

Thus the deadlines could be regarded as arbitrary. All this affects whether a situation must be seen as a "crisis," with a close and definite deadline.

Talking to the Bundys, Kai is probably in the most promising position to get at the real decision-making in 1964-65. Another would be talking to Clifford (setting aside McNamara, of course.) He (and I) should look at the whole list of surviving officials from that period.

I could well be at the heart of this "cold war history" investigation. I should speak to Hershberg about it, about getting in on the Cold War History Project. After all, how can one interpret or investigate the Soviet archives without the best sense possible of US decision-making during the period? And better equipped for that than me? (There is also the National Security Archive). Those are the teams I could best be among (shades of RAND).

xdtd/2ndoutline

THE CONSTRUCTION OF INSTABILITY

KEY "FACTS"/UN-FACTS (LIES) FOR UNDERSTANDING POST-WAR (PRE-WAR?)
WORLD

- I. Strategic bombing policy
- II. Motives for Hiroshima/Nagasaki
- III. Early postwar U.S. nuc plans
- IV. Motives for increase in nucs, H-bomb (early '49, after SU bomb)
- V. Motives for "defense" build-up (NSC-68)
- VI. Motives for troops to Europe, NATO
- VII. U.S. postwar aims
 - A. CFR, 1939-45/"Grand World"
 - B. Aims with respect to Germany (armament, division, "Western")
 - C. "Free trade"
- VIII. U.S. nuc predominance
 - A. 1945-49
 - B. 1950-64
- IX. U.S. FU threats, and "successes"
- X. Relation of SAC/SIOP to FU threat
 - A. Credibility
 - B. Possibility of successful LW
 - C. Hence, possibility of credibility and success of U.S. interventions
- XI. Relation of current plans to my SIOP Guidance
 - A. Why is my old planning showing up in new plans?
 - B. Why relevant now?
- XII. What "arms controllers" leave out/don't know (neglect of nuc threats)
- XIII. Ambiguities
 - A. Types of deterrence
 - B. Types of stability
 - C. Types of "FS"
 - D. Regions of FU
 - E. "Security" (of US interests)

XIV. Theories of build-up:

- A. "For Type I Deterrence"
- B. Second-strike damage-limitation
 - 1. Why the need?
 - 2. Why fear SU 2nd strike?
 - 3. US FS cap., threats; US preemption, FU threats

XV. How did USG build Doomsday Machine?

XVI. How Could They/We?

XVII. U.S. CIA (and financial) role in control, coups

- A. In TW
- B. In W. Europe
- C. In U.S.?

XVIII. USG willingness, to use, as instruments:

- A. Torture and imprisonment (via proxies)
- B. Destruction of democracy
- C. Assassinations
- D. Bombing of civililans
- E. Destruction of dikes, dams: flooding, starvation
- F. Coups
- G. Economic warfare
 - 1. Boycott of credit, oil/energy, spare parts
 - 2. Blockade

XIX. Need for possibility of public incomprehension: secrecy, lies, distraction, control of interpretation

XX. NATO as "Alliance for U.S. FU" (endorsement of "Mass-Murder, Inc.")

XXI. Shift from A to H bombs in plans and inventories

No real effort to "uninvent, abolish big dirty bombs on either side: even as some are replaced by "small, clean, usable bombs" for "war-fighting"; or to prevent escalation--which remains as threat in order to limit nuc wars, and make them winnable, usable.

XXII. New CF Race: 1967-87

- A. MIRVs
- B. Accuracy
- C. MMIII/improved 1977
- D. BS-18/improved 1981
- E. P/CM (SS-20...)

XXIII. Deliberate Instability

XXIV. French and Soviet concerns about Germany: armed, unified, independent

XXV. U.S. concern for oil of Middle East, on par with NATO (1946

plans, on; AirLand Battle 2,000, 1982...)

XXVI. Relation to FU threats in Middle East

- A. Vs. indigenous "radicals" (or "fundamentalists")
- B. Vs. Soviet support, or regional legitimacy (negotiations)

XXVII. (Covert) U.S. attitude to proliferation, "among friends"

XXVIII. Unwillingness of USG/Pres. to seek an end to the arms race, forego testing, or forego the maintenance of CF, credible FU/FS threat

XXIX. Recurrent USG under-estimation of the commitment of TW opponents to nationalism, and capacity for patriotic resistance to U.S.-backed regimes, and to U.S. bombing and troops (like other aggressors)

XXX. Falsity of implications of public rationale for Hiroshima as a precedent

In fact, Presidents' willingness to contemplate FU of nucs to avert "non-extraordinary" set-backs (not involving need to "avoid one million US casualties" or end WWII); and to plan FS--to risk the Northern Hemisphere--to avert threats (loss of W. Europe) that are not unprecedented (like SU FS).

XXXI. US public, and USG, non-acceptance of Nuremberg Principles

XXXII. Need to demonstrate US strength and will

Some US Presidents came to office having proclaimed that the US was (seen as) inferior in strength and will. They have hence been inclined to increase and demonstrate both.

- A. JFK!
- B. Reagan
- C. Ike

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"HOW COULD THEY/WE?" IDEOL. OF PREPS FOR NUC WAR

PATRIOTISM AND DISSENT: "UNQUESTIONED", "UNQUESTIONING"

ETHICAL AUTONOMY VS. OBEDIENCE

BUREAUCRATIC MORALS, BUREAUCRATIC MADNESS

AUTHORITY AND RATIONAL CHOICE

OBEDIENCE IN INSTITUTIONS: LIMITS OF RATIONAL ACTIONS MODEL

AUTHORITY AND DOMINATION

TORTURE AND OBEDIENCE

BITBURG/WALDHEIM/RESPONSIBILITY

MODEL: BUREAUCRATIC EVIL

MADMEN AND BUREAUCRATS

NUCLEAR ETHICS AND DETERRENCE

MORALITY AND NUC WAR

JUST TERRORISM

RATIONAL CHOICE: "LESSER EVILS" AND THE RESTRAINED RACE TO
OBLIVION

AGAINST DETERRENCE: DAD'S PROPOSITION

NUCLEAR PARADOXES: DETERRENCE/ETHICS

STRATEGIC BOMBING AND JUST WAR

"THE TRAIN HAS LEFT THE STATION..."

PRESIDENTS AND THREATS: WERE THEY BLUFFING? COULD THEY CONTROL?
WHAT WERE EFFECTS?

MILGRAM/KELMAN: "NO CHOICE"

FAILING RIGHT: "BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY"

CRISIS PATTERN

REVENGE AND SHAME

DYNAMICS OF NUC RACE

THE BALANCE OF TERROR: MORE DELICATE THAN WE KNOW
US AIMS IN NUC RACE -- SUPERIORITY: BECAUSE...
CAUSES OF FAILURE OF DETERRENCE OR COMPELLANCE/COMPLIANCE
INABILITY TO STOP / ESCALATION / "WWI PROBLEM"
ESCALATION AND PRESIDENT
DYNAMICS OF EXTERMINISM
DOOMSDAY MACHINE
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THE STABILITY OF INSTABILITY
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ON BLAIR, C³
DYNAMICS OF NUC THREATS
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WINNING AT AMERICAN-RUSSIAN ROULETTE
D.E. THEORY OF NUC ARMS RACE: PREEMPTION/ESCALATION/INTERVENTION
THE RULES FOR MADMAN'S BLUFF
DAMAGE LIMITATION AND STABILITY

CHOOSING INSTABILITY: RISK AND MADNESS

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ON AJW -- DELICATE BALANCE OF TERROR

U.S. AND SOVIET NUCLEAR POLICY: A COMPARISON

MAINTAINING CRISIS STABILITY BY AVOIDING D-5'S ON BOTH SIDES

NUCLEAR WAR BY MISTAKE

COMPUTERS / C³I / ACCIDENTAL WAR

THE STALEMATE MACHINE / COLD WAR IDEOLOGY

THREAT DYNAMICS AND DETERRENCE

PRIORITIES, VALUES, "CONSENSUS": "WE AGREE ON ENDS..."

WHAT ARE NUCS FOR? US/SU MOTIVES

EMPIRE: STABILITY AND REVOLUTION

PARITY AND STABILITY

COSTS/PRICE OF "NO NFU": FU THREATS/SUCCESSSES FOR SUPERIORITY

DELEGATION

SU MOTIVES FOR CF, D-L...AND LIBERALS' NEGLECT

D-5 AND PREEMPTION

"UNTHINKABLE"

DYNAMICS OF FU THREATS

SU "ATOMIC BLACKMAIL" = THREAT TO RETALIATE TO U.S. FU!

ON ICELAND SUMMIT AND R'S "REVEALED PREFS"

RULE THE WORLD! HOW TO... YOU CAN...! 10 STEPS TO... FU, ESCAL
NUCLEAR EMPIRE, STABILITY, AND ARMS CONTROL

CULTURAL LAG/HUMAN LIMITS

WHAT SHOULD THE ROLE OF AMERICAN MIL POWER BE IN THE 1980's?

STATE TERRORISM

STOPPING NUCLEAR TERRORISM

US/SU "EVIL EMPIRES" AND INTERVENTIONS

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE PENTAGON PAPERS

LESSONS OF VN

VN 1965 DECISIONS MODEL: MALENESS, ADDICTION, S-R VS. L-R
CONTROL, INSOLVABLE PROBLEMS

LESSONS OF THE PP

WAR AGAINST CITIES

WHAT ARE THE REAL STAKES OF THE COLD WAR?

FAITS MALACCOMPLIS/CRISES

CRISES AND SECRECY/LIES

SECRECY POLICY: WHERE DO YOU DRAW THE LINE?

SECRECY: MEANINGS, USES, EFFECTS

THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE NUC ARMS RACE

THE ARMS RACE: THE WAY OUT

THE DANGEROUS POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF NUCLEAR TESTING

D.E. NUC STRATEGY PROJECT

S-R PROGRAM

L-R PROGRAM

ARMS CONTROL AIMS

A CITIZENS' ARREST OF THE NUC ARMS RACE

ALTERNATIVES TO MUTUAL/MASS SUICIDE

AIMS FOR YEAR 2000

US/SU TREATY COMPLIANCE

ppii\proposal
1 May 1990
5:00 AM

PENTAGON PAPERS II: WHAT ELSE I COPIED

At 4:02 AM on the night of April 30-May 1--the 15th anniversary of the ending of the Vietnam War and the entry of the NLF/NVA into Saigon--I woke up with the thought:

On the Twentieth Anniversary of the publishing of the Pentagon Papers: I could publish the missing parts of the papers I copied, the parts that never got out, including the parts that got "lost in the hurricane."

Moreover, I could publish a book that would tell the story surrounding those parts: the part of my life that dealt with nuclear planning, first-use threats and "inadvertent war," both before and after the Pentagon Papers, including my earlier, mostly unsuccessful efforts to get all this to public attention and to create an antinuclear movement.

This would also cover: Why Nixon really tried to stop me. Why HAK thought I was "the most dangerous man in America," why the Plumbers were really set on me, what they wanted to keep me from telling: Nixon's secret nuclear threats to Vietnam (and his real policy to end, and win, the war. His--my--"Madman Theory."

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Ln

Part I: The Unreleased Data

--The Delegation of Presidential Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons. Deception about this during 1964 campaign.

--The nature of the JSCP and the SIOP.

--The general problem of unauthorized action. The situation at Kunsan. (And my initial memo on authentication and unauthorized action: and the possibility of a PAL. See my D on Command and Control). Accidents and unauthorized action (see Sagan's interest).

--War Plans: GEOP, NATO, JSCP.

--In particular: the emphasis on preemption; the first-use/first-strike likelihood; actual expectations as to the likelihood of precipitating incidents (e.g., uprising in East Germany); allout nature; "alternative undertakings";

--Actual deployment of nuclear weapons in Japan: Iwakuni. (Subsequent confirmation of this. Implications for Japan Security Treaty; inferences as to why no action by McNamara).

(All the above were covered in my January 1960 briefing to Bundy, reflected in his memo to JFK given to me by Sagan).

--My memos on the Emergency Action Message, "actual consequences of release"; on NATO planning; etc. [Try to get these from RAND, via FOIA: a test case of use of FOIA for a contractor?!]

--The nuclear references censored out of the Pentagon Papers, and out of the published negotiations volumes.

--My draft of the Basic National Security Policy, the basis of SecDef guidance for the JSCP 63 and, it appears, for later Carter/Reagan planning. My accompanying memos for this. (Note that no documents on this planning have yet been released under FOIA).

--My draft of the Deputy SecDef "questions" on the JSCP and the story of their non-response. (Talk to Gilpatric about this).

--My (JFK) question to the JCS on fatalities in the SU and China, and their response.

--Draft of McNamara message to SAC, Power, on new options for SIOP.

--Later notes on modified JSCPs, and new BNSP.

--Material in my 1971 briefing to Charlie Nesson, on patterns of secrecy in USG.

--Whole file on Cuban Missile Crisis: transcripts, notes: including:

--Nitze's personal notes on ExComm (never released to historians--see Trachtenberg note: Nitze told Blight and Welch he had lost them!), and my interview with him, and with Yarmolinsky, bearing on his and McNamara's and Rusk's initial reaction ("We would have to eat them.")

--Whole story of PSALM clearance; Cline interview. Effects of "lying in State, ." on JFK's own surprise by the missiles. Indications of JFK option of concealing evidence on the missiles till the election; and how this bore on Khrushchev's possible plan to control the risks of his project, and hence on his timing (both otherwise till now unexplained).

--hsr study in August: early concern about the possibility of missiles.

--Mongoose documents: though newly released in 1989, link to me via Lansdale! And via "plumbers"! Relation to "provocation

planning" known to me in connection with Tonkin Gulf incidents in 1964! (And see briefing to me by CIA in 1961, and my reaction: "This is all good fun, but what is the point of it? Where does it lead?"

--McN memo (never released) of October 2 on occasions for implementing invasion or attack plans.

--My own experience in Crisis, including Rostow briefings, and my own memos.

--Turkish missiles! What JFK really had ordered, what he and McN feared...what I worked on Saturday night. Added to recent revelations on JFK and McN expectations as to how the crisis would be resolved, this bears on what JFK's real strategy was, and how much his actions involved bluffs (neither of which has ever been imagined in published analyses).

--The incident on the night of October 26, 1962: what I learned, what I drew from it...and subsequent revelations on this and on Cuban antiaircraft and inferences...How the Crisis could actually have exploded in its last 24 hours, despite the personal willingness of both leaders to settle without war.

--My whole theory, and manuscript, on "Faits Malaccomplis." (See new data by Goldgeier).

--Hypotheses on risk-taking by leaders, reflecting Kahneman-Tversky findings: bringing in data on LBJ in 1965 (and the Challenger, and other cases of Constructing a Catastrophe).

--My experience with plans for invasion of Cuba in 1961, and my visit to Guantanamo. The actual costs and risks of possible war in Cuba, as seen from the perspective of Vietnam (and Panama).

--Notes on Rowen's and Nitze's actual expectations of the odds on nuclear war (Nitze: 1 in 10).

--Khrushchev-JFK letters, including the still-misinterpreted October 26 letter. (These have now been released, yet the latter crucial letter is still almost universally misdescribed, reflecting the initial misleading paraphrases of it. The actual lack of clear contradiction between the "Friday night" and "Saturday morning" letters has never been recognized).

--My interview with RFK 1964, on two ultimatums (and, e.g., on whether Dobrinin had "lost his usefulness").

--The actual deceptions by Soviet officials: Did they "lie"? Why not? Why the emphasis on this by American officials?

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--Notes from my 1964 Crisis Study, including, in addition to Cuba material above:

--Minutes of Vienna Conference, 1961, and Paris Conference 1960 (bearing on U-2; plus interviews with Bissell).

--WSEG Critical Incidents Studies, including Laos Study and Tonkin Gulf Study.

--Halperin's Taiwan Straits Study, including nuclear parts still censored.

--State Department study of Berlin Crisis.

--Notes on Suez crisis.

--Documents on Vietnam, drafted for Kissinger in 1968-69:

--NSSM-1.

--Summary of responses on NSSM-1.

--Options Paper (never released!)

--Try to get on FOIA the Kissinger NSSMs on nuclear matters from my RAND safe.

[Compag]

c:\auto\campaign.s1
July 11, 1994

--early 1978: N-bomb. AMsterdam rally; UK, Denmark, Sweden, Norway.

--april 78--april 79: Rocky Flats

Actions

Interviews in fall: Horowitz, Ballad (NBC)

Trial

Jonestown (Mark Lane); Moscone/Milk

Last action, trial

--Feb 78: UCWeapons Labs Conversion Project

--Feb 78: read Haldeman, Ends of Power

--early 77: founding of MfS (Norma Becker; Phil Berrigan in jail; Sid Lens, The Day Before Doomsday)

--Spring 1977; reading and writing notes on Marx, Anderson, Wallerstein (and Buddhism)

--editorial board of Socialist Revolution: quitting in July 1977 (they schedule meeting for August 6, 1977: Hiroshima Day, start of MfS: MGE's first rally)

--Thus: MGE born on May 12, 1977!

--(? Paul Jacobs' cancer must have appeared about same time; he died in early 1978)

--concern about neutron bomb

--August 6 and 7, rallies at GG Park and Diablo

--October: first (?) teach-ins on nuclear war. "Start of movement to abolish nuclear weapons: as, to end VN War. Can we succeed? We did last time."

--October 31: Hersh confirms my delegation stories.
DELEGATION ISSUE.

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